The Radical Academy Discussion Forum

Ivo

Sep 26, 07 - 10:11 PM

species impressa et expressa

The Second Article of Question 85 of Part I of the Summa theologiae concerns the question
whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood.

Thomas' answer is;
The intelligible species is to the intellect what ther sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather that by which the sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands.
+
Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands. … But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness … .

I said that “species sensibilis” should NOT be translated as “sensible species" but as “sensible image”.

Here may be why:
F.C.. Copleston, “Aquinas”, Penguin Books, pp. 181-182;
Aquinas employs the Aristotelian distinction between the active and passive intellects, two distinct functions of the mind. According to him the active intellect ‘illumines’ the image of the object apprehended by the senses; that is to say, it actively reveals the formal and potential universal element which is implicitly contained in the image. It then abstracts this potentially universal element and produces in the passive intellect what Aquinas calls the “species impressa”. The passive intellect reacts to this determination by the active intellect, and the result is the “species expressa”, the universal concept in the full sense.

Does sensible species mean impressed or expressed species?

Kevin

Sep 27th, 2007 - 8:05 AM

Re: species impressa et expressa

(snip)...
IVO:
I said that “species sensibilis” should NOT be translated as “sensible species" but as “sensible image”.

Here may be why:
F.C.. Copleston, “Aquinas”, Penguin Books, pp. 181-182;
Aquinas employs the Aristotelian distinction between the active and passive intellects, two distinct functions of the mind. According to him the active intellect ‘illumines’ the image of the object apprehended by the senses; that is to say, it actively reveals the formal and potential universal element which is implicitly contained in the image. It then abstracts this potentially universal element and produces in the passive intellect what Aquinas calls the “species impressa”. The passive intellect reacts to this determination by the active intellect, and the result is the “species expressa”, the universal concept in the full sense.

IVO:
Does sensible species mean impressed or expressed species?

REPLY:
You said that "sensible species" should be translated as "sensible IMAGE". So why are you, now, asking about "sensible species" (which you have denied) rather than "sensible IMAGES" which you affirm, after denying "sensible species".

So your question should be, since you deny "sensible species", which you translate (meaning others made the mistake and you believe them) as "sensible IMAGE", rephrase:

IVO:
Does sensible (XXXspeciesXXX)IMAGE mean impressed or expressed (XXXspeciesXXX) IMAGE?

Take your pick! Some images can be impressed on coins for example. Other images are expressed, or, better, reflected from mirrors and/or still bodies of water. Others are arguably expressed by or from the pixels on your TV screen or upon Motion Picture Film Screens, which receive no impressions, but rather give them.

But you're actually still "lost", per usual, Ivo, this time for CONTRADICTING Aquinas and "siding" with his mistranslator/s. You deny something and then ask a question about what you denied. That is how "lost" you really and truly are, Ivo.

Kevin

Ivo

Sep 27th, 2007 - 7:59 PM

Re: species impressa et expressa

Kevin,

1.
You recognised earlier that you don't speak Latin.

How can you argue that am siding with a (Dominican, like Thomas) mistranslator?

I am siding with Alvira, Clavell, Melendo, Van Steenberghen, De Wulf, Couloubaritsis and other sensible Europeans who read Latin.

I am siding against insensible North Americans like Van Inwagen and Nozick who do not know what they are speaking about.

2.
You are not even interested in the meaning of species impressa and species expressa.

I quoted Copleston as saying that for Thomas, the potentially universal element is being abstracted by the mind, thereby producing the species impressa in the mind.
I said that Copleston continues by saying that the result of the REACTION of the active intellect to this is the “species expressa”, the universal concept in the full sense.

And you are talking about coins, pixels on my TV screen or upon Motion Picture Film Screens, which receive no impression.

Is this a joke?

Can a coin, a TV screen react?

3.
Our host teaches:
“The Schoolmen employed the terms species impressa and expressa to signify these two aspects (impression and reaction) relating sensuous knowledge to the object known or to the subject knowing.”
http://www.radicalacademy.com/philaquinasmdw3.htm
and thus translates “expressio” not as “expression” but as “REACTION”

But the dictionary in your mind probably also says otherwise,
just as it says that “species sensibilis” should be translated as “sensible species”, not as “sensible image”.

Right, I, who am totally lost, also translated “species expressa” as “expressed species",
but why do you then give an even wronger/more wrong translation of “expressio” as “reflection”?

Indeed, you are writing:
Take your pick! Some images can be impressed on coins for example. Other images are EXPRESSED, OR, BETTER, REFLECTED from mirrors and/or still bodies of water. Others are arguably expressed by or from the pixels on your TV screen or upon Motion Picture Film Screens, which receive no impressions, but rather give them.

Is the concept of “reaction” not wider than that of “reflection”?

Of course, we don’t achieve anything on this Forum. One of the participants (SmallMind, where are you?) is a Cartesian and knows everything.

Kevin

Sep 27th, 2007 - 10:45 PM

Re: Re: species impressa et expressa

Kevin,

1.
You recognised earlier that you don't speak Latin.

Correct. But I have a very good Latin translator, in Anton C. Pegis and can consult St. Thomas's texts in both Latin and English. I also have a Latin English and vice versa tranlation program. So I am in real good shape to notice mistranslations. Have you ever read Aristotle's ON INTERPRETATION? Words and Images are NOT "ideas", according to Aristotle. Words and images are SIGNS of affections in the soul.

ARISTOTLE:
Just as all men have not the same speech sounds, so they do not have the same written symbols. But the mental experiences that these (sound-SYMBOLS and visible-SYMBOLS) directly represent are the same for all men, as are those THINGS of which our experiences are IMAGES.

IVO:
How can you argue that am siding with a (Dominican, like Thomas) mistranslator?

ANSWER:
Because no SPECIES; whether sensible or intelligible species; is an IMAGE. That's why. It is a mistranslation to call a "species sensibilis" a SENSIBLE IMAGE because IMAGES are both perceived and perceptible. But Aquinas tells us that "sensible species", as well as "intelligible species", are NOT "that which" we perceive, but rather THAT BY WHICH (the means) we perceive sensations (sensible species are not perceived) and THAT BY WHICH we understand intelligible objects. Neither type of species is THAT WHICH we perceive. That's why. I have applied the Law of Thought to Aquinas's actual assertions of Q. 85, Article 2., while understanding that IMAGES are THAT WHICH we perceive, whereas both kinds of SPECIES are NOT THAT WHICH we perceive.

I must be a "genius", like all 4 year olds. Even they know that IMAGES are THAT WHICH they perceive.

IVO:
I am siding with Alvira, Clavell, Melendo, Van Steenberghen, De Wulf, Couloubaritsis and other sensible Europeans who read Latin.

REPLY:
Well! Since they are so sensible and read Latin, let's have their translations of "species sensiblilis". And as I previously recommended HOW DO FRENCH AND GERMAN TRANSATORS translate "species sensibilis"? If they all say "sensible IMAGE", they are wrong because Aquinas uses distinct and different terms for IMAGES.

IVO:
I am siding against insensible North Americans like Van Inwagen and Nozick who do not know what they are speaking about.

REPLY:
Correction Ivo. You are AGAINST myself. We're having this argument. Not them. "Species Sensibilus" does not mean "sensible image". A phantasm or material likeness is a sensible image, but a "sensible species" is an imperceiveable light wavelength, percussion in the air, type of molecule in one's mouth, etc. etc.

2.
You are not even interested in the meaning of species impressa and species expressa.

REPLY:
That is correct, because both of those terms refer to INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES. Not to "sensible species". And besides, I don't know Latin and have never heard Aquinas use those terms.

IVO:
I quoted Copleston as saying that for Thomas, the potentially universal element is being abstracted by the mind (ie. AGENT or active intellect KB), thereby producing the species impressa in the mind (ie. In the POSSIBLE or passive intellect).

COMMENT:
"Potentially universal", you say. Universals, according to a lot of people, are "everwhere and always", rather than "potential". As Aquinas also points out there is no need for an "agent sense", because the senses are all passive towards the "sensible species" of things which actively affect sensory organs.

IVO
I said that Copleston continues by saying that the result of the REACTION of the active intellect to this is the “species expressa”, the universal concept in the full sense.

REPLY:
You don't know what "this" you are talking about Ivo, because you haven't distinguished images from sensible species, nor from intelligible species.

IVO:
And you are talking about coins, pixels on my TV screen or upon Motion Picture Film Screens, which receive no impression. Is this a joke?

REPLY:
No, not a joke. I was writing about IMAGES vs. sensible species. Images are impressed on film, and expressed on screens. The pixels on your screen contantly react to direct electron gun stimulation. And coins which are metal receive impressions and express them when illuminated by photons. I was writing about actual images.

IVO:
Can a coin, a TV screen react?

REPLY:
Coins receive and retain images. They strongly, but passively, resist (passively react to) actions which can deface such impressions. But they may be deformed, thereby losing the images impressed upon them. TV screens constantly react and are constantly refreshed, just like the cones and rods in your non-detached retina. No big deal.

But all this stuff is about IMAGES and not about intelligible species. And this thread began with the distinction of intellect from sense.

More to follow

KB

Ivo Cerckel

Sep 28th, 2007 - 5:44 AM

Re: species impressa et expressa

You, who don't know Latin,
continue to maintain that the translation by the Dominican Fathers,
translation which is now more than half a century old,
is wrong.

What do you want me to tell you?

Kevin

Sep 28th, 2007 - 6:29 AM

Re: species impressa et expressa

IVO:
3.
Our host teaches:
“The Schoolmen employed the terms species impressa and expressa to signify these two aspects (impression and reaction) relating sensuous knowledge to the object known or to the subject knowing.”
http://www.radicalacademy.com/philaquinasmdw3.htm
and thus translates “expressio” not as “expression” but as “REACTION”

REPLY:
I have now read and thoroughly enjoyed the whole series of essays by De Wulf, edited by J. Dolhenty. De Wulf was a Belgian. No wonder you constantly refer to him. He apparently died a year before I was born. What you quote above was from a section of De Wulf's on sensation. What you quoted by Fr. Copleston was on intellectual abstraction.

So now I know what you, De Wulf and Copleston were apparently talking about by means of the "Englishified" (by me) expressions, (1) "impressed species" and (2) "expressed species".

For either case of "species", it seems apparent to me (on reading De Wulf) that we have to distinguish (1a) sensible impressed species and (1b) sensible expressed species, AND (2a) intelligible impressed species and (2b) intelligible expressed species, while distinguishing both kinds of SPECIES from IMAGES (remembered phantasms/images; or sensed material-likeness/images, in the here and now).

I have laid before you the "phantasms" of known entities such as light wave-lengths, decibals of sound percussion, sugar and vinegar molecules, which, respectively, (i) impress themselves upon passive nerve receptors in the rods and cones of our retinas, (ii) cause ear-drums to passively vibrate, which, in turn causes 3 little "bones", likened to hammer anvil and stirrup, to vibrate and then nerve endings at the base of hair-like projections in our inner ears or canals or whatever react to the motion of the little bones and cause signals to go to the auditory lobe of our brains, and (iii) stimulate receptors in diverse taste buds, peculiarly designed to react to only specific molecules (some buds and their nerve endings only react to sugar molecules; others to acid molecules; perhaps others to basic or bitter molecules). Similarly with specialized receptors in our skins.

So those specific kinds of SPECIFIC stimulating AGENTS probably correspond to De Wulf's SENSIBLE "species impressa". In sum these highly SPECIFIC kinds of stimulating agents impress themselves upon highly SPECIFIC kinds impressable sense organs, which are passive to such stimulating AGENTS. However, then the nerve endings, which are common to all such organs get highly active.

Modern physiologists KNOW exactly what ACTIVITY follows upon the stimulation of nerve endings located in such organs of sense. That activity probably corresponds to De Wulf's "sensible species expressa". Their expressed activity consists of "waves of localized depolarization" running down those nerve fibres which arrive in very SPECIFIC areas of our brains. But it doesn't even stop there because the various "lobes" communicate, once again by means of waves of localized depolarization.

DeWulf is very careful, as is Aquinas and even myself in insisting upon the FACT that none of that passivity (impression upon senses) or activity (nerve "firings" of waves of localized depolarization) is PERCEIVED by either the organs of sense or our brains, or our nerve endings. We don't sense sugar molecules or vinegar molecules or wavelengths of light far too short/small to perceive, nor air concussions of various frequencies. We perceive NONE of those SPECIFIC impressions or expressions.

However, THAT WHICH we do perceive, or sense, are INTEGRAL WHOLES, to wit, IMAGES, colors, smells, sounds, tastes and touch sensations. DeWulf's constant example is an oak tree, with its rough bark, solid sound, great height, rustling leaves, swaying branches, green foliage, and cylindrically shaped trunk which we perceive, eg. 10 feet away from ourselves. We don't PERCEIVE the oak, inside our heads, sense organs, brains or nerve endings. Not at all. Instead we PERCEIVE that oak tree "out there". In short the INTEGRAL IMAGE is THAT WHICH we perceive. The unperceived SPECIES or SPECIFICS of sensation/perception are THE MEANS BY WHICH (not "THAT WHICH") we experience "perception".

Then he carries on the ANALOGY of sense to intellect, in the same way. But this time there is a minor problem, because MATERIAL LIKENESSES or images, or "recalled-images" (phantasms) of visible, audible, tactile, olfactory or gustatory varieties (phantasms from any or all of the 5 senses enumerated by Aristotle and Aquinas) are MATERIAL in nature and origin. They can't make IMPRESSIONS upon an immaterial power.

However, the SPECIES by which we form such visible, tactile, audible, olfactory and gustatory SENSATIONS are less concrete and static than hard material surfaces, or scratched skin, or sound waves, or vinegar molecules and more like energetic light waves with specific wave lengths.

WHY? (contd.)
KB

Kevin

Sep 28th, 2007 - 8:37 AM

Re: species impressa et expressa

Previously:
However, the SPECIES by which we form such visible, tactile, audible, olfactory and gustatory SENSATIONS are less concrete and static than hard material surfaces, or scratched/tickled skin, or sound waves, or vinegar molecules and more like energetic light waves with specific wave lengths (of which Aquinas and Aristotle had no conception).

WHY?

Because "waves of localized depolarization" are very much like or ANALOGOUS-to light waves. Aquinas is fond of saying that the sense of sight is our most "spiritual-sense" because it doesn't require direct contact with a sensed object. Hearing and smelling are less "spiritual", for one sense requires percussion (hearing), the other (smelling) requires heat. Touch and taste are the least spiritual senses because they require direct contact with a sensed object, in order to be "altered".

Last post I finished with De Wulf's, Aquinas's and Aristotle's "slight problem". That problem is, in effect: How can IMAGES (seen heard tasted smelled and touched kinds of analogous "images") formed-from/because-of "sensible species" (that-by-which; not THAT WHICH; The sensations are THAT WHICH we "sense/perceive"), with material sources, apprehended by means of material organs, leave any IMPRESSION (or have any affect upon) an IMMATERIAL power? In two words, THEY CAN'T.

Thus they posit an AGENT or ACTIVE intellect, which "illumines/lights-up" such images, or recalled images (phantasmata) somehow sensed by our bodies.

As to "somehow sensed", De Wulf is fond of REPEATING that, let me quote him accurately:

DE WULF:. We ought never to ask of a theory more than it undertakes to DO. (ie. Arguably "to do" means either "To Explain or To Predict".)

"Illumination" in both Aquinas and Aristotle is "tricky" because neither thought that light moved. They thought that light makes potentially luminous media (air; water) to be actually luminous or transparent. Their arguments are cogent and reasonable. As Aristotle argues and Aquinas repeats him, it "STRAINS THE CREDIBILITY" to think that all of East to West can be instantly illuminated and that we don't notice light's supposed movemen!

Over a short distance, argues Aristotle, we might fail to notice light's hypothesized motion. But over such a vast distance the CREDIBILITY of careful observers becomes "strained". So he, with Aquinas "following", relied upon his potency/act distinctions. Light makes the potentially transparent to be actually transparent.

So any analogy to the intellectual "illumination" of phantasms/images, by the AGENT-intellect (active intellect) in Aquinas's writings, arguably refers to transforming such IMAGES, from being "potentially transparent" to being "actually transparent", as an ANALOGY to physical light's action upon "potentially luminous" bodies of air and water.

Maybe that is why Copleston was talking about images, which are "potentially universal", being made "actually universal" by the action of the AGENT/active intellect. But Copleston was definitely writing about intelligible species (ideas), and their abstraction, in what Ivo quoted of him, while De Wulf was certainly talking about IMAGES and sensible species in Ivo's other quote. Let's see...

De Wulf:
"The sense or psychic power of sight does not derive from itself the content of its act of vision. An impulse coming from outside and received by me is an indispensable factor, without which an act of sight would be impossible. But as soon as that impulse coming from the oak tree is received in me, I react to the stimulus, and this vital reaction completes the sense perception.

The whole phenomenon is imprinted from outside, and exhibited from inside; it has a passive aspect and an active one. The Schoolmen employed the terms species impressa and expressa to signify these two aspects (impression and reaction) relating sensuous knowledge to the object known or to the subject knowing. Thomas insists that this sense impression "is not known directly" (id quod cognoscitur).

What is present to sense consciousness, what we attain to, is the thing itself -- the oak tree.

COMMENT:
See! The man was talking about sensation and not about intellectualization or universalization, by abstraction from images. But he does so, further on.

To be contd.
KB

Kevin

Sep 28th, 2007 - 11:00 AM

Re: Re: species impressa et expressa

Previously De Wulf was talking about SENSATION and "the schoolmen's" terms of "species impressa" and "species expressa", which signify BOTH the passive and active aspects of SENSATION/perception.

De Wulf used the terms "IMPULSE", then "STIMULUS" and, finally, vital "REACTION" when talking about SENSING an Oak tree. Recall,

De Wulf:
"An IMPULSE coming from outside and received by me is an indispensable factor, without which an act of sight would be impossible. But as soon as that IMPULSE coming from the oak tree is received in me, I react to the STIMULUS, and this vital REACTION completes the sense perception."

COMMENTS:
Wherever DeWulf writes IMPULSE, above, he could have just as easily written "sensible specie/s". By synthesizing his term, "impulse" with Aquinas's and Aristotle's terms, "sensible species", De Wulf's expressions, "received IMPULSE" and "STIMULATION" could be just as easily phrased as "received or apprehended SPECIFIC SENSIBLE IMPULSE/s", which "STIMULATE" specific organ systems.

It is interesting to note that De Wulf didn't want to discuss the PHYSICS of Aquinas and Aristotle, in relation to sensation. But they were very good on PERCUSSION resulting in "heard sounds" --- probably because of the mathematical-arithmetical relation of percussion to harmonics. They were not so good on light with respect to vision.

But Aristotle was very good on "anomalies" of sense, with respect to vision and touch. He mentions that gentle pressure on the eyes can cause us to see light, even in utter darkness. Gently pushing under the eye, in daylight, causes us to "see double". And "crossing our fingers" when we touch a single object, like a pencil, with crossed fingers, CAUSES us to "sense" 2 objects, where "uncrossed fingers" would only sense one object.

On the "Physics" of the sense of taste, I love Aquinas's expression to the effect that "Our tongues are moistened by the humidity of flavors." In "modern" Pavlovian terms:- Salt 'n vinegar potatoe chips CAUSE us to drool.

But, above all, in terms of both PHYSICS and LOGIC, both Aquinas and Aristotle say a lot about how SPECIFIC senses, whether sight, hearing, smell, taste or touch, DISTINGUISH CONTRARY QUALITIES among the proper objects of sense.

eg. Black vs White are CONTRARY colors (specific to sight). Hot vs Cold are CONTRARY tactile sensations. Moist vs. Dry are sensed as CONTRARIES by both taste and touch. Rough and Smooth are CONTRARIES discernable by the senses of both touch and taste. Sharp vs. Flat notes are contraries discernable by the sense of hearing. Foul vs. fair (fetching or sweet), are CONTRARY odors, discernable by the sense of smell, as are BITTER vs. SOUR, contrary tastes. Even the arguable CONTRARIES of motion vs. stasis, or increase vs. decrease can be sensed by more than one specific sense.

In sum, CONTRARIETY is a fundamental concept in all scientific disciplines. And our first easily, and readily, discernable CONTRARIES are given to us, on a proverbial "platter", in and by sensation.

I am surprized De Wulf didn't mention such CONTRARIES, given his citations of a scholastic maxim to the effect that "Everything that ends up in the mind begins with (and in) the senses."

Still De Wulf is very good on Thomistic Theory and was certainly talking about SENSATION with his reference to "species impressa" relating to the passive nature of sensation and "species expressa" being a REACTION to sensory stimulation. I referred to what De Wulf calls the "reactive" aspect of sensation as "waves of localized depolarization".

I did so because those "depolarization waves" are exactly WHAT is caused by a reaction-to or, in other words, a stimlation-of SPECIFIC sense receptors.

De Wulf was also very good, in mentioning, requote

DE WULF:
Thomas insists that this sense impression "is not known directly" (id quod cognoscitur). What is present to sense consciousness, what we attain to, is the thing itself -- the oak tree.

COMMENT:
That is De Wulf's way of saying exactly what St. Thomas argues in Q. 85, Article 2. We don't know "sensible species directly". They are "that-by-which" we directly see an Oak Tree. The oak is THAT WHICH we actually perceive or "attain" to use De Wulf's expression.

Then comes the ANALOG of sensation with/to abstraction and IDEA-formation ("intelligible species" formation) by abstraction from PERCEIVED IMAGES or remembered IMAGES (phantasmata).

That there is a PASSIVE aspect to the intellectual power, is analogous to the receptive or passive potentiality of the senses. Thus the term POSSIBLE (potential/passive) INTELLECT. Q. 79 Article 2 is relevant. The problem is:- How can material phenomena ACT upon an immaterial power. Since they cannot, the AGENT or ACTIVE intellect is posited.

But such an AGENT/actor is not "reactive", like stimulated sense organs. The power of the agent intellect is more ACTIVE, than reactive.

contd.

Kevin

Sep 28th, 2007 - 1:15 PM

Re: Re: species impressa et expressa

With regard to the passive (potential; possible) POWER, or aspect, of the Intellect (ie. "possible intellect") Aquinas distinguishes 3 meanings of the term passive, in Summa I, Q. 79. Article 2. The 3rd sense or meaning of to be "passive" comes from the fact that, quote:

AQUINAS:
"...what is in potentiality to something, receives that to which it was in potentiality without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. It is THUS that to UNDERSTAND is to be passive."

It is such a passive power, which receives INTELLIGIBLE "species impressa", or intelligible species for short. But, since physical things, like images, cannot ACT upon an immaterial power, by their own agency, the AGENT/active intellect was posited by Aristotle, long before Aquinas's time.

Summa I, Q. 79., Articles 3. through 5. is where Aquinas treats of the ACTIVE or AGENT intellect. Article 3, Reply Obj. 2. is where Aquinas presents two physical theories as to the effect of light. He eventually draws a parallel between physical light illuminating physical things, and the agent intellect "illumining" phantasms, so that the "possible intellect" can be informed, by the "agent intellect" with intelligible species (ideas) abstracted from such "phantasms/images".

AQUINAS:
"...But since Aristotle did not allow that the forms of natural things exist apart from matter (ie. Plato's doctrine of a separate world of the forms KB), and since forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible (ie. understandable KB) it follows that the natures or forms of the sensible things which we UNDERSTAND are not actually intelligible/(understandable KB). (PARADOX! KB) Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses are made actual by what is actually sensible. We must, therefore, assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by the abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for positing an AGENT intellect. [Summa I, Q. 79. Article 3. Exerpt from I ANSWER THAT...]

BACK TO IVO'S CRITICISMS:
3.3.
Our host teaches:
“The Schoolmen employed the terms species impressa and expressa to signify these two aspects (impression and reaction) relating sensuous knowledge to the object known or to the subject knowing.”
http://www.radicalacademy.com/philaquinasmdw3.htm
and thus translates “expressio” not as “expression” but as “REACTION”

YES! But De Wulf is relating "REACTION" to "species expressa", with RESPECT to the "reactive" aspect of SENSATION, in this section of his essay/s.

IVO:
But the dictionary in your mind probably also says otherwise, just as it says that “species sensibilis” should be translated as “sensible species”, not as “sensible image”.

RETORT:
No! Now that I understand what De Wulf was talking about and THAT he was talking about SENSATION and not IDEA FORMATION, "sensible species expressa" (active) makes sense, as does "sensible species impressa" (passive), because I know that "sensible species" are pushed like waves (of depolarization) right into various brain lobes.

And to EX-PRESS literally means "to push out". With the ACTIVE aspect of sensation, the "pushing" (expression) is inward to the brain-stem and brain-lobes. But the brain also "pushes out" (expresses) reactions to such stimulations, so that, for example, we almost instantly, pull our hand away from a hot stove, without "thinking about it".

As to my translation of "species sensibilis", as "sensible species", I continue to hold my ground. Sensible species are NOT "sensible IMAGES", and the author you cited, along with Aquinas, reconfirmed that learned-from-Aquinas (and my own experience) thesis, requote (your cited author):

DE WULF:
Thomas insists that this sense impression "is not known directly" (id quod cognoscitur).

But an "oak image" is directly seen. It is THAT WHICH we perceive, by means of "sensible species", which are "that-by-which" we perceive OAK IMAGES.

IVO:
Right, I, who am totally lost, also translated “species expressa” as “expressed species".

REPLY:
As you should. There are a lot of latin derivatives in modern English, French, Italian, etc. etc. Our ancient predecessors in Europe spoke Latin as their scholarly and technical language. Q'elle surprise! (Probably misspelled).

IVO:
But why do you then give an even wronger/more wrong translation of “expressio” as “reflection”?

REPLY:
Because I was talking about images, and you were talking about ideas. Have you ever seen your image REFLECTED by a mirror, or by still water, or by the glass in the window of a building. Parallel to ideas, another question:-

Have you never heard someone write a "piece" entitled "Reflections upon the war in 'wherever'", EXPRESSED in/by words?

contd.
KB

Kevin

Sep 28th, 2007 - 4:52 PM

Re: species impressa et expressa

IVO:
Indeed, you are writing:

KEVIN (requoted):
Take your pick! Some images can be impressed on coins for example. Other images are EXPRESSED, OR, BETTER, REFLECTED from mirrors and/or still bodies of water. Others are arguably expressed by or from the pixels on your TV screen or upon Motion Picture Film Screens, which receive no impressions, but rather give them.

IVO:
Is the concept of “reaction” not wider than that of “reflection”?

ANSWER:
The "reaction" to which De Wulf referred was a sensitive REACTION to the stimulation, of an organ or organs of sense. So neither he, nor I were talking about CONCEPTS or IDEAS. We were talking about IMAGES and the "sensible species" which result in images of OAK TREES --- not concepts of oaks.

You, by contrast, were clealy confusing Fr. Copleston's INTELLIGIBLE "species impressa" (impressed-species; actually abstracted-species) upon the POSSIBLE-intellect, with De Wulf's explanation of SENSIBLE "species impressa" upon a sense organ, and the REACTION (sensible species expressa) of that impressed organ to being stimulated by "sensible species".

Fr. Copleston was clearly writing about the POSSIBLE and AGENT/active intellect abstracting IDEAS from "phantasms". I doubt he referred to the agent-intellect "REACTING" to an INTELLIGIBLE "species impressa" formed by its own ACTIVITY.

The intellectual ACTIVITY of the agent and possible intellect, after concept formation (intelligible species formation; idea formation) is the ACTIVE (not "reactive") composition and division of INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES (ideas).

Such ACTIVITY, arguably involving both the AGENT and POSSIBLE intellects (One power; two operations, to wit (1) Abstraction by which intelligible species are abstracted from images and (2) composition or division of intelligible species with or from each other) is what Aquinas calls the "verbum mentis" (mental word/s) which become EXPRESSED by speech --- primarily propositional speech.

AQUINAS:
Q. 85. Art. 2.
Obj. 3. "Further, the philosopher says that WORDS ARE SIGNS OF PASSIONS (a.k.a. affections KB) IN THE SOUL. But words signify the THINGS understood, for we EXPRESS by word what we UNDERSTAND. Therefore these passions of the soul, viz. the INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES are WHAT is actually UNDERSTOOD.

ON THE CONTRARY: The intelligible species is to the intellect what the SENSIBLE SPECIES (Anton Pegis translation; Professor Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies; TORONTO ONTARIO CANADA; Imprimitur James Cardinal McGuigan; Archbishop of Toronto, dated Jan 23, 1948; Copywrite Random House Inc. 1945, 1948; THE MODERN LIBRARY - New York) is to the sense. But the SENSIBLE SPECIES (Pegis!!!) is not WHAT is perceived, but rather, THAT BY WHICH the sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not WHAT is actually UNDERSTOOD but THAT BY WHICH the intellect understands.

I ANSWER THAT, Some have asserted...this however is manifestly false for two reasons...Therefore it must be said that the INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES (idea/s) is related to the intellect as THAT BY WHICH it understands, which is proved thus...(etc.)

REPLY OBJ. 3:
There are 2 operations in the sensitive part. One is limited to IMMUTATION, and thus the operation of the senses take place when the senses are IMPRESSED by the sensible. The other is FORMATION, inasmuch as the imagination FORMS for itself an IMAGE of an absent thing, or even of something never seen.

Both of these OPERATIONS are found in the INTELLECT (Intellectual immutation and formation? Probably since IMAGINATION is in other animals KB).

AQUINAS (on 2 intellectual operations):
For, (1) in the first place, there is the passion of the POSSIBLE-intellect, as INFORMED by the intelligible species (by abstraction of INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES from IMAGES in the composite with the AGENT intellect's power; 1 intellectual operation KB); and (2) then the POSSIBLE intellect, as thus INFORMED, then FORMS a DEFINITION, or a DIVISION, or a COMPOSITION, which is EXPRESSED by language.

And so, the NOTION signified by a TERM is a DEFINITION; and a PROPOSITION signifies the intellect's DIVISION or COMPOSITION. Words do not, therefore, signify the INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES themselves (ie. They signify the things understood by means of intelligible species. KB); but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of JUDGING of EXTERNAL THINGS.

IVO (requoted)
Is the CONCEPT of “reaction” not wider than that of “reflection”?

REPLY:
IRRELEVANT! The concepts of ABSTRACTION, idea-FORMATION, idea-COMPOSITION and idea-DIVISION, all which occur UNCONSCIOUSLY in our minds/souls, until they are made PERCEIVABLE/sensible by means of spoken or written SYMBOLS, are the significant CONCEPTS which you fail to apprehend. Reaction and Reflection concern IMAGES more than IDEAS.

This stuff is NOT "naive realism", nor simple-minded empiricism-AND/OR-rationalism. It's complex.

KB

Kevin

Sep 28th, 2007 - 6:46 PM

Re: species impressa et expressa

Sep 28th, 2007 - 5:44 AM
Re: species impressa et expressa

IVO:
You, who don't know Latin, continue to maintain that the translation by the Dominican Fathers, which is now more than half a century old,is wrong.

What do you want me to tell you?

REPLY:
Tell me that you looked up a translation of that Latin or English 2-term expression in some language that you understand. Try French. Try German. Try Latin, since you had 6 years of it. Try Tagalo if you actually understand that language.

I said that I don't SPEAK Latin, Ivo. But I can certainly UNDERSTAND simple Latin terms used by Aquinas and simple Greek terms used by Aristotle, because Scientific language is loaded with literal English transliterations of such technical terms, which SCIENTISTS were "too lazy" to translate. So they TRANSLITERATED such terms.

Most significantly, I am using the TRANSLATION of Anton Pegis, as I previously stated. And he was a PONTIFICAL ACADEMY "medieval scholar", which means he KNEW "medieval Latin", probably far better than the English Dominicans of the 1920's.

"Popish priests" were still inordinately unpopular in Victorian England. Catholic universities were probably non-existent at the time. The English Catholic priesthood was almost still "underground" until John Henry Cardianl Newman's "betrayal" of the English Church or "conversion" to Roman Catholocism made being Roman Catholic quasi-respectable.

Then there was "the great war" of 1914 - 1918, which arguably made English Dominican consultation or collaboration with French Dominicans difficult and with German Dominicans "treasonous". And they didn't do a translation of the SUMMA that quickly. The Leonine Edition of St. Thomas's Works has been ongoing since Leo The Great's Pontificate!!!

So the English Dominican translation of The Summa was miraculously "quick" compared with an unfinished papal edition of Aquinas's complete works. Maybe their Swahili or Chineze translators are "bogging" down the "process". I have no idea WHAT they could be doing to "take forever".

Maybe SATAN is their Chief Translator for all I know. "It" would arguably want Aquinas "slowed down" but "full speed ahead" for Robert Nozick vs. John Rawls and a cast of "thousands-of-sophists-with-tenure", including the "50-xth" Edition of Lord Russell's 1912 edition of THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY, which should have been titled "THE actual PROBLEMS with BRITISH EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY" (one FALSE Contrary) vs. "MORE actual PROBLEMS with CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY" (the other FALSE Contrary).

And you should be able to consider, that the England of the pre-1920's still ruled an empire. Their scientists and mathematicians were "top drawer". Their astronomers were "the best". Nobody had "dethroned" Newton. They were VICTORIANS (even the Catholics) and proud/happy to be English, while BRITISH EMPIRICISM was proving far more science- enlightening than Cartesian-Kantian anything.

So the English Dominicans had to be influenced by British Empiricism, even and especially as critics. They'd be required to take philosophy courses, featuring British Empiricists. And the British Empiricists uniformly CONFUSE or CONFLATE "images" with "ideas". So it would be, all told, a very easy thing for an English Dominican to, very innocently, confuse or conflate an "image" and an "idea".

Your De Wulf author noted the phenomenon. And my translator, Anton Pegis, caught them in another small mistranslation where somebody ignored "tantum", meaning "ONLY" (eg Sed tantum dic verbo... = But ONLY say the word...).

That (missed-term) mistranslation tended to cause an egregious MISINTERPRETATION of another answer to a question of the Summa because the word ahead of "tantum/only" was the term "NOT".

There is a huge difference between "NOT-X" and "NOT-ONLY-X". I forget where that mistranslation, caused by a missing term, occurs, but it caused a big "ruckus" between James Miguez and myself on his so-called "Thomism" site. However he talks about "Cartesian-Thomists", while trying to avoid obvious equivalents like "Square-Circles".

He, like you Ivo, tried to hide behind "Latin Expertise" and claimed "Latin Incompetence" on my part. But I have a Latin translator and medical laboratory experience. Aristotle and disciples almost invented modern medical discipline (and much of the language) except for the "hypotheses", which would have caused Aristotle to "wince".

But Aristotle loved FORMULAE and OBSERVATION, which is exactly WHAT applied laboratory science ENTAILS. The research guys fool around with hypotheses. But applied-science-techs employ PROVEN formulae and "Aristotelian" OBSERVATIONAL techniques.

Any UTTER-ILLITERATE who has eyes can OBSERVE the structural difference between the SHAPES Aquinas uses to symbolize IMAGE and the different SHAPES he uses to sybolizing SPECIES! Q.E.D.

Kevin

Ivo Cerckel

Sep 29th, 2007 - 4:50 PM

Re: species impressa et expressa

You mean Latin illiterate who translates species as species?

Kevin

Oct 4th, 2007 - 3:52 AM

Re: Re: species impressa et expressa

KEVIN:
Any UTTER-ILLITERATE who has eyes can OBSERVE the structural difference between the SHAPES Aquinas uses to symbolize IMAGE and the different SHAPES he uses to sybolizing SPECIES! Q.E.D.

Kevin

IVO:
You mean Latin illiterate who translates species as species?

REPLY:
No! I mean the English Dominican functional illiterate/s who/which CONFLATED the Latin term "species" with the English term "IMAGE"! That functional illiterate or functional illiterates thereby TRANSLATED the Latin expression "species sensibilus" of Aquinas, into the English expression "sensible IMAGE", thereby confusing an IMAGE (English) with a SPECIES (English).

And nobody "TRANSLATES" (your exprssion) terms which have been TRANSLITERATED from one language (Latin) to another language (English)! In short "species" is a Latin term and an English term. It is the same term in both English and Latin because the term was "transliterated". To be "transliterated" means to take a term from one language and introduce it into another language without changing either its spelling or its MEANING, otherwise known as its DEFINITION.

Hence, to (as you do, Ivo) speak of a TRANSLITERATED expression (transliterated from Latin to English; same spelling and same meaning) such as SPECIES (Latin term), as a TRANSLATED term (English term "SPECIES"; same term and same meaning in both languages) is to DEMONSTRATE your ignorance of the difference between TRANSLATION and TRANSLITERATION. In short, nobody has to "translate" individual terms from one language into another language when they are the same terms with the same definitions in two distinct languages.

I also told you that SCIENTISTS are "notorious" for TRANSLITERATING terms from one language into another language. That is because, at one time, people who were trained as scholars, were required to study either Latin or Greek (preferably BOTH) in order to obtain ANY University degree, in either "the arts" or "the sciences".

Similarly, prior to "modern universities", anyone who wanted to "talk shop" in THEOLOGY, for example, in the "medieval universities", was required to know BOTH Latin and Greek terms, in order to understand anything about Theology, because the languages of "original theology", for medieval Christians, like Aquinas, were Hebrew or Greek, even when Latin was one's original language or "mother tongue".

It is not a strict "accident" that Pontius Pilate had his inscription written in Hebrew, Greek and Latin on Christ's cross. The Romans took over the Hellenistic Empire from the Greeks. And there were 10 strictly Greek cities in "Philistia" [the land of the Philistines; a name which was a Roman snub of the Hebrew names Juda (Jacob's lion-like son) and Israel (Jacob's name after he wrestled with an angel)] or Palestine (as it is known today; derived from "Philistia")] called the DECAPOLIS [literally 10 Cities; a tranliteration of the Roman word for 10, "deca" equivalent to the Greek "deka" and the Greek term for city "polis"; Thus DECAPOLIS --- perfectly understood by Latin speakers, who also knew Greek. Hence, no need to TRANSLATE "transliterations"].

As a consequence of such close INTERACTION between Roman and Greek citizens of "THE ROMAN EMPIRE" Greek terms were tranliterated into Latin terms. And since St. Paul was literate in all 3 languages where philosophical and scientific terms were used (Hebrew, Greek and Latin), the language of "theology" (a Greek expression) consisted of a lot of transliterated terms. All of Christian theology employed Greek terms, at first, because it was only Greek Christians who argued theology and dogma (Greek term) at the early Ecumenical Councils.

The first major Christian theologian who WROTE ONLY IN LATIN was Augustine because he didn't like the beatings he received from his "tutor" in the Greek tongue. But he still UNDERSTOOD the Greek language. He simply refused to write "Greek".

My son, who teaches English literature, still presides over TUTORials, with his students --- another Latin to English transliteration from the Latin "tutor" (watcher-of-students/pupils). One really cannot read an English Dictionary, such as my Oxford Concise, without noticing that a modern English vocabulary consists, in large part, of Greek, Latin, French and Germanic transliterations!

IN SUM, nobody "translates" transliterations. However, one may be able to DEFINE the Latin term SPECIES and the transliterated English term SPECIES in either language. And the DEFINITIONS should be identical, although the terms used, in either language, will, of course, be different terms, since NO LANGUAGE is entirely transliterated. Were that the case, then every human would speak and have the same language.

IN CONCLUSION:- "Species" does not strictly mean "IMAGE" in either Latin or English. So, once again, we have a bad and confusing mistranslation of Aquinas's "species-sensibilus" by English Dominicans in both languages.
Kevin

Author	Comment
Ivo Sep 26, 07 - 10:11 PM	species impressa et expressa The Second Article of Question 85 of Part I of the Summa theologiae concerns the question whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood. Thomas' answer is; The intelligible species is to the intellect what ther sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather that by which the sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands. + Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands. … But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness … . I said that “species sensibilis” should NOT be translated as “sensible species" but as “sensible image”. Here may be why: F.C.. Copleston, “Aquinas”, Penguin Books, pp. 181-182; Aquinas employs the Aristotelian distinction between the active and passive intellects, two distinct functions of the mind. According to him the active intellect ‘illumines’ the image of the object apprehended by the senses; that is to say, it actively reveals the formal and potential universal element which is implicitly contained in the image. It then abstracts this potentially universal element and produces in the passive intellect what Aquinas calls the “species impressa”. The passive intellect reacts to this determination by the active intellect, and the result is the “species expressa”, the universal concept in the full sense. Does sensible species mean impressed or expressed species? Email: ivocerckel@siquijor.ws
Kevin Sep 27th, 2007 - 8:05 AM	Re: species impressa et expressa (snip)... IVO: I said that “species sensibilis” should NOT be translated as “sensible species" but as “sensible image”. Here may be why: F.C.. Copleston, “Aquinas”, Penguin Books, pp. 181-182; Aquinas employs the Aristotelian distinction between the active and passive intellects, two distinct functions of the mind. According to him the active intellect ‘illumines’ the image of the object apprehended by the senses; that is to say, it actively reveals the formal and potential universal element which is implicitly contained in the image. It then abstracts this potentially universal element and produces in the passive intellect what Aquinas calls the “species impressa”. The passive intellect reacts to this determination by the active intellect, and the result is the “species expressa”, the universal concept in the full sense. IVO: Does sensible species mean impressed or expressed species? REPLY: You said that "sensible species" should be translated as "sensible IMAGE". So why are you, now, asking about "sensible species" (which you have denied) rather than "sensible IMAGES" which you affirm, after denying "sensible species". So your question should be, since you deny "sensible species", which you translate (meaning others made the mistake and you believe them) as "sensible IMAGE", rephrase: IVO: Does sensible (XXXspeciesXXX)IMAGE mean impressed or expressed (XXXspeciesXXX) IMAGE? Take your pick! Some images can be impressed on coins for example. Other images are expressed, or, better, reflected from mirrors and/or still bodies of water. Others are arguably expressed by or from the pixels on your TV screen or upon Motion Picture Film Screens, which receive no impressions, but rather give them. But you're actually still "lost", per usual, Ivo, this time for CONTRADICTING Aquinas and "siding" with his mistranslator/s. You deny something and then ask a question about what you denied. That is how "lost" you really and truly are, Ivo. Kevin Email: PaedoSocrates@aol.com
Ivo Sep 27th, 2007 - 7:59 PM	Re: species impressa et expressa Kevin, 1. You recognised earlier that you don't speak Latin. How can you argue that am siding with a (Dominican, like Thomas) mistranslator? I am siding with Alvira, Clavell, Melendo, Van Steenberghen, De Wulf, Couloubaritsis and other sensible Europeans who read Latin. I am siding against insensible North Americans like Van Inwagen and Nozick who do not know what they are speaking about. 2. You are not even interested in the meaning of species impressa and species expressa. I quoted Copleston as saying that for Thomas, the potentially universal element is being abstracted by the mind, thereby producing the species impressa in the mind. I said that Copleston continues by saying that the result of the REACTION of the active intellect to this is the “species expressa”, the universal concept in the full sense. And you are talking about coins, pixels on my TV screen or upon Motion Picture Film Screens, which receive no impression. Is this a joke? Can a coin, a TV screen react? 3. Our host teaches: “The Schoolmen employed the terms species impressa and expressa to signify these two aspects (impression and reaction) relating sensuous knowledge to the object known or to the subject knowing.” http://www.radicalacademy.com/philaquinasmdw3.htm and thus translates “expressio” not as “expression” but as “REACTION” But the dictionary in your mind probably also says otherwise, just as it says that “species sensibilis” should be translated as “sensible species”, not as “sensible image”. Right, I, who am totally lost, also translated “species expressa” as “expressed species", but why do you then give an even wronger/more wrong translation of “expressio” as “reflection”? Indeed, you are writing: Take your pick! Some images can be impressed on coins for example. Other images are EXPRESSED, OR, BETTER, REFLECTED from mirrors and/or still bodies of water. Others are arguably expressed by or from the pixels on your TV screen or upon Motion Picture Film Screens, which receive no impressions, but rather give them. Is the concept of “reaction” not wider than that of “reflection”? Of course, we don’t achieve anything on this Forum. One of the participants (SmallMind, where are you?) is a Cartesian and knows everything. Email: ivocerckel@siquijor.ws
Kevin Sep 27th, 2007 - 10:45 PM	Re: Re: species impressa et expressa Kevin, 1. You recognised earlier that you don't speak Latin. Correct. But I have a very good Latin translator, in Anton C. Pegis and can consult St. Thomas's texts in both Latin and English. I also have a Latin English and vice versa tranlation program. So I am in real good shape to notice mistranslations. Have you ever read Aristotle's ON INTERPRETATION? Words and Images are NOT "ideas", according to Aristotle. Words and images are SIGNS of affections in the soul. ARISTOTLE: Just as all men have not the same speech sounds, so they do not have the same written symbols. But the mental experiences that these (sound-SYMBOLS and visible-SYMBOLS) directly represent are the same for all men, as are those THINGS of which our experiences are IMAGES. IVO: How can you argue that am siding with a (Dominican, like Thomas) mistranslator? ANSWER: Because no SPECIES; whether sensible or intelligible species; is an IMAGE. That's why. It is a mistranslation to call a "species sensibilis" a SENSIBLE IMAGE because IMAGES are both perceived and perceptible. But Aquinas tells us that "sensible species", as well as "intelligible species", are NOT "that which" we perceive, but rather THAT BY WHICH (the means) we perceive sensations (sensible species are not perceived) and THAT BY WHICH we understand intelligible objects. Neither type of species is THAT WHICH we perceive. That's why. I have applied the Law of Thought to Aquinas's actual assertions of Q. 85, Article 2., while understanding that IMAGES are THAT WHICH we perceive, whereas both kinds of SPECIES are NOT THAT WHICH we perceive. I must be a "genius", like all 4 year olds. Even they know that IMAGES are THAT WHICH they perceive. IVO: I am siding with Alvira, Clavell, Melendo, Van Steenberghen, De Wulf, Couloubaritsis and other sensible Europeans who read Latin. REPLY: Well! Since they are so sensible and read Latin, let's have their translations of "species sensiblilis". And as I previously recommended HOW DO FRENCH AND GERMAN TRANSATORS translate "species sensibilis"? If they all say "sensible IMAGE", they are wrong because Aquinas uses distinct and different terms for IMAGES. IVO: I am siding against insensible North Americans like Van Inwagen and Nozick who do not know what they are speaking about. REPLY: Correction Ivo. You are AGAINST myself. We're having this argument. Not them. "Species Sensibilus" does not mean "sensible image". A phantasm or material likeness is a sensible image, but a "sensible species" is an imperceiveable light wavelength, percussion in the air, type of molecule in one's mouth, etc. etc. 2. You are not even interested in the meaning of species impressa and species expressa. REPLY: That is correct, because both of those terms refer to INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES. Not to "sensible species". And besides, I don't know Latin and have never heard Aquinas use those terms. IVO: I quoted Copleston as saying that for Thomas, the potentially universal element is being abstracted by the mind (ie. AGENT or active intellect KB), thereby producing the species impressa in the mind (ie. In the POSSIBLE or passive intellect). COMMENT: "Potentially universal", you say. Universals, according to a lot of people, are "everwhere and always", rather than "potential". As Aquinas also points out there is no need for an "agent sense", because the senses are all passive towards the "sensible species" of things which actively affect sensory organs. IVO I said that Copleston continues by saying that the result of the REACTION of the active intellect to this is the “species expressa”, the universal concept in the full sense. REPLY: You don't know what "this" you are talking about Ivo, because you haven't distinguished images from sensible species, nor from intelligible species. IVO: And you are talking about coins, pixels on my TV screen or upon Motion Picture Film Screens, which receive no impression. Is this a joke? REPLY: No, not a joke. I was writing about IMAGES vs. sensible species. Images are impressed on film, and expressed on screens. The pixels on your screen contantly react to direct electron gun stimulation. And coins which are metal receive impressions and express them when illuminated by photons. I was writing about actual images. IVO: Can a coin, a TV screen react? REPLY: Coins receive and retain images. They strongly, but passively, resist (passively react to) actions which can deface such impressions. But they may be deformed, thereby losing the images impressed upon them. TV screens constantly react and are constantly refreshed, just like the cones and rods in your non-detached retina. No big deal. But all this stuff is about IMAGES and not about intelligible species. And this thread began with the distinction of intellect from sense. More to follow KB Email: PaedoSocrates@aol.com
Ivo Cerckel Sep 28th, 2007 - 5:44 AM	Re: species impressa et expressa You, who don't know Latin, continue to maintain that the translation by the Dominican Fathers, translation which is now more than half a century old, is wrong. What do you want me to tell you? Email: ivocerckel@siquijor.ws
Kevin Sep 28th, 2007 - 6:29 AM	Re: species impressa et expressa IVO: 3. Our host teaches: “The Schoolmen employed the terms species impressa and expressa to signify these two aspects (impression and reaction) relating sensuous knowledge to the object known or to the subject knowing.” http://www.radicalacademy.com/philaquinasmdw3.htm and thus translates “expressio” not as “expression” but as “REACTION” REPLY: I have now read and thoroughly enjoyed the whole series of essays by De Wulf, edited by J. Dolhenty. De Wulf was a Belgian. No wonder you constantly refer to him. He apparently died a year before I was born. What you quote above was from a section of De Wulf's on sensation. What you quoted by Fr. Copleston was on intellectual abstraction. So now I know what you, De Wulf and Copleston were apparently talking about by means of the "Englishified" (by me) expressions, (1) "impressed species" and (2) "expressed species". For either case of "species", it seems apparent to me (on reading De Wulf) that we have to distinguish (1a) sensible impressed species and (1b) sensible expressed species, AND (2a) intelligible impressed species and (2b) intelligible expressed species, while distinguishing both kinds of SPECIES from IMAGES (remembered phantasms/images; or sensed material-likeness/images, in the here and now). I have laid before you the "phantasms" of known entities such as light wave-lengths, decibals of sound percussion, sugar and vinegar molecules, which, respectively, (i) impress themselves upon passive nerve receptors in the rods and cones of our retinas, (ii) cause ear-drums to passively vibrate, which, in turn causes 3 little "bones", likened to hammer anvil and stirrup, to vibrate and then nerve endings at the base of hair-like projections in our inner ears or canals or whatever react to the motion of the little bones and cause signals to go to the auditory lobe of our brains, and (iii) stimulate receptors in diverse taste buds, peculiarly designed to react to only specific molecules (some buds and their nerve endings only react to sugar molecules; others to acid molecules; perhaps others to basic or bitter molecules). Similarly with specialized receptors in our skins. So those specific kinds of SPECIFIC stimulating AGENTS probably correspond to De Wulf's SENSIBLE "species impressa". In sum these highly SPECIFIC kinds of stimulating agents impress themselves upon highly SPECIFIC kinds impressable sense organs, which are passive to such stimulating AGENTS. However, then the nerve endings, which are common to all such organs get highly active. Modern physiologists KNOW exactly what ACTIVITY follows upon the stimulation of nerve endings located in such organs of sense. That activity probably corresponds to De Wulf's "sensible species expressa". Their expressed activity consists of "waves of localized depolarization" running down those nerve fibres which arrive in very SPECIFIC areas of our brains. But it doesn't even stop there because the various "lobes" communicate, once again by means of waves of localized depolarization. DeWulf is very careful, as is Aquinas and even myself in insisting upon the FACT that none of that passivity (impression upon senses) or activity (nerve "firings" of waves of localized depolarization) is PERCEIVED by either the organs of sense or our brains, or our nerve endings. We don't sense sugar molecules or vinegar molecules or wavelengths of light far too short/small to perceive, nor air concussions of various frequencies. We perceive NONE of those SPECIFIC impressions or expressions. However, THAT WHICH we do perceive, or sense, are INTEGRAL WHOLES, to wit, IMAGES, colors, smells, sounds, tastes and touch sensations. DeWulf's constant example is an oak tree, with its rough bark, solid sound, great height, rustling leaves, swaying branches, green foliage, and cylindrically shaped trunk which we perceive, eg. 10 feet away from ourselves. We don't PERCEIVE the oak, inside our heads, sense organs, brains or nerve endings. Not at all. Instead we PERCEIVE that oak tree "out there". In short the INTEGRAL IMAGE is THAT WHICH we perceive. The unperceived SPECIES or SPECIFICS of sensation/perception are THE MEANS BY WHICH (not "THAT WHICH") we experience "perception". Then he carries on the ANALOGY of sense to intellect, in the same way. But this time there is a minor problem, because MATERIAL LIKENESSES or images, or "recalled-images" (phantasms) of visible, audible, tactile, olfactory or gustatory varieties (phantasms from any or all of the 5 senses enumerated by Aristotle and Aquinas) are MATERIAL in nature and origin. They can't make IMPRESSIONS upon an immaterial power. However, the SPECIES by which we form such visible, tactile, audible, olfactory and gustatory SENSATIONS are less concrete and static than hard material surfaces, or scratched skin, or sound waves, or vinegar molecules and more like energetic light waves with specific wave lengths. WHY? (contd.) KB Email: PaedoSocrates@aol.com
Kevin Sep 28th, 2007 - 8:37 AM	Re: species impressa et expressa Previously: However, the SPECIES by which we form such visible, tactile, audible, olfactory and gustatory SENSATIONS are less concrete and static than hard material surfaces, or scratched/tickled skin, or sound waves, or vinegar molecules and more like energetic light waves with specific wave lengths (of which Aquinas and Aristotle had no conception). WHY? Because "waves of localized depolarization" are very much like or ANALOGOUS-to light waves. Aquinas is fond of saying that the sense of sight is our most "spiritual-sense" because it doesn't require direct contact with a sensed object. Hearing and smelling are less "spiritual", for one sense requires percussion (hearing), the other (smelling) requires heat. Touch and taste are the least spiritual senses because they require direct contact with a sensed object, in order to be "altered". Last post I finished with De Wulf's, Aquinas's and Aristotle's "slight problem". That problem is, in effect: How can IMAGES (seen heard tasted smelled and touched kinds of analogous "images") formed-from/because-of "sensible species" (that-by-which; not THAT WHICH; The sensations are THAT WHICH we "sense/perceive"), with material sources, apprehended by means of material organs, leave any IMPRESSION (or have any affect upon) an IMMATERIAL power? In two words, THEY CAN'T. Thus they posit an AGENT or ACTIVE intellect, which "illumines/lights-up" such images, or recalled images (phantasmata) somehow sensed by our bodies. As to "somehow sensed", De Wulf is fond of REPEATING that, let me quote him accurately: DE WULF:. We ought never to ask of a theory more than it undertakes to DO. (ie. Arguably "to do" means either "To Explain or To Predict".) "Illumination" in both Aquinas and Aristotle is "tricky" because neither thought that light moved. They thought that light makes potentially luminous media (air; water) to be actually luminous or transparent. Their arguments are cogent and reasonable. As Aristotle argues and Aquinas repeats him, it "STRAINS THE CREDIBILITY" to think that all of East to West can be instantly illuminated and that we don't notice light's supposed movemen! Over a short distance, argues Aristotle, we might fail to notice light's hypothesized motion. But over such a vast distance the CREDIBILITY of careful observers becomes "strained". So he, with Aquinas "following", relied upon his potency/act distinctions. Light makes the potentially transparent to be actually transparent. So any analogy to the intellectual "illumination" of phantasms/images, by the AGENT-intellect (active intellect) in Aquinas's writings, arguably refers to transforming such IMAGES, from being "potentially transparent" to being "actually transparent", as an ANALOGY to physical light's action upon "potentially luminous" bodies of air and water. Maybe that is why Copleston was talking about images, which are "potentially universal", being made "actually universal" by the action of the AGENT/active intellect. But Copleston was definitely writing about intelligible species (ideas), and their abstraction, in what Ivo quoted of him, while De Wulf was certainly talking about IMAGES and sensible species in Ivo's other quote. Let's see... De Wulf: "The sense or psychic power of sight does not derive from itself the content of its act of vision. An impulse coming from outside and received by me is an indispensable factor, without which an act of sight would be impossible. But as soon as that impulse coming from the oak tree is received in me, I react to the stimulus, and this vital reaction completes the sense perception. The whole phenomenon is imprinted from outside, and exhibited from inside; it has a passive aspect and an active one. The Schoolmen employed the terms species impressa and expressa to signify these two aspects (impression and reaction) relating sensuous knowledge to the object known or to the subject knowing. Thomas insists that this sense impression "is not known directly" (id quod cognoscitur). What is present to sense consciousness, what we attain to, is the thing itself -- the oak tree. COMMENT: See! The man was talking about sensation and not about intellectualization or universalization, by abstraction from images. But he does so, further on. To be contd. KB Email: PaedoSocrates@aol.com
Kevin Sep 28th, 2007 - 11:00 AM	Re: Re: species impressa et expressa Previously De Wulf was talking about SENSATION and "the schoolmen's" terms of "species impressa" and "species expressa", which signify BOTH the passive and active aspects of SENSATION/perception. De Wulf used the terms "IMPULSE", then "STIMULUS" and, finally, vital "REACTION" when talking about SENSING an Oak tree. Recall, De Wulf: "An IMPULSE coming from outside and received by me is an indispensable factor, without which an act of sight would be impossible. But as soon as that IMPULSE coming from the oak tree is received in me, I react to the STIMULUS, and this vital REACTION completes the sense perception." COMMENTS: Wherever DeWulf writes IMPULSE, above, he could have just as easily written "sensible specie/s". By synthesizing his term, "impulse" with Aquinas's and Aristotle's terms, "sensible species", De Wulf's expressions, "received IMPULSE" and "STIMULATION" could be just as easily phrased as "received or apprehended SPECIFIC SENSIBLE IMPULSE/s", which "STIMULATE" specific organ systems. It is interesting to note that De Wulf didn't want to discuss the PHYSICS of Aquinas and Aristotle, in relation to sensation. But they were very good on PERCUSSION resulting in "heard sounds" --- probably because of the mathematical-arithmetical relation of percussion to harmonics. They were not so good on light with respect to vision. But Aristotle was very good on "anomalies" of sense, with respect to vision and touch. He mentions that gentle pressure on the eyes can cause us to see light, even in utter darkness. Gently pushing under the eye, in daylight, causes us to "see double". And "crossing our fingers" when we touch a single object, like a pencil, with crossed fingers, CAUSES us to "sense" 2 objects, where "uncrossed fingers" would only sense one object. On the "Physics" of the sense of taste, I love Aquinas's expression to the effect that "Our tongues are moistened by the humidity of flavors." In "modern" Pavlovian terms:- Salt 'n vinegar potatoe chips CAUSE us to drool. But, above all, in terms of both PHYSICS and LOGIC, both Aquinas and Aristotle say a lot about how SPECIFIC senses, whether sight, hearing, smell, taste or touch, DISTINGUISH CONTRARY QUALITIES among the proper objects of sense. eg. Black vs White are CONTRARY colors (specific to sight). Hot vs Cold are CONTRARY tactile sensations. Moist vs. Dry are sensed as CONTRARIES by both taste and touch. Rough and Smooth are CONTRARIES discernable by the senses of both touch and taste. Sharp vs. Flat notes are contraries discernable by the sense of hearing. Foul vs. fair (fetching or sweet), are CONTRARY odors, discernable by the sense of smell, as are BITTER vs. SOUR, contrary tastes. Even the arguable CONTRARIES of motion vs. stasis, or increase vs. decrease can be sensed by more than one specific sense. In sum, CONTRARIETY is a fundamental concept in all scientific disciplines. And our first easily, and readily, discernable CONTRARIES are given to us, on a proverbial "platter", in and by sensation. I am surprized De Wulf didn't mention such CONTRARIES, given his citations of a scholastic maxim to the effect that "Everything that ends up in the mind begins with (and in) the senses." Still De Wulf is very good on Thomistic Theory and was certainly talking about SENSATION with his reference to "species impressa" relating to the passive nature of sensation and "species expressa" being a REACTION to sensory stimulation. I referred to what De Wulf calls the "reactive" aspect of sensation as "waves of localized depolarization". I did so because those "depolarization waves" are exactly WHAT is caused by a reaction-to or, in other words, a stimlation-of SPECIFIC sense receptors. De Wulf was also very good, in mentioning, requote DE WULF: Thomas insists that this sense impression "is not known directly" (id quod cognoscitur). What is present to sense consciousness, what we attain to, is the thing itself -- the oak tree. COMMENT: That is De Wulf's way of saying exactly what St. Thomas argues in Q. 85, Article 2. We don't know "sensible species directly". They are "that-by-which" we directly see an Oak Tree. The oak is THAT WHICH we actually perceive or "attain" to use De Wulf's expression. Then comes the ANALOG of sensation with/to abstraction and IDEA-formation ("intelligible species" formation) by abstraction from PERCEIVED IMAGES or remembered IMAGES (phantasmata). That there is a PASSIVE aspect to the intellectual power, is analogous to the receptive or passive potentiality of the senses. Thus the term POSSIBLE (potential/passive) INTELLECT. Q. 79 Article 2 is relevant. The problem is:- How can material phenomena ACT upon an immaterial power. Since they cannot, the AGENT or ACTIVE intellect is posited. But such an AGENT/actor is not "reactive", like stimulated sense organs. The power of the agent intellect is more ACTIVE, than reactive. contd. Email: PaedoSocrates@aol.com
Kevin Sep 28th, 2007 - 1:15 PM	Re: Re: species impressa et expressa With regard to the passive (potential; possible) POWER, or aspect, of the Intellect (ie. "possible intellect") Aquinas distinguishes 3 meanings of the term passive, in Summa I, Q. 79. Article 2. The 3rd sense or meaning of to be "passive" comes from the fact that, quote: AQUINAS: "...what is in potentiality to something, receives that to which it was in potentiality without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. It is THUS that to UNDERSTAND is to be passive." It is such a passive power, which receives INTELLIGIBLE "species impressa", or intelligible species for short. But, since physical things, like images, cannot ACT upon an immaterial power, by their own agency, the AGENT/active intellect was posited by Aristotle, long before Aquinas's time. Summa I, Q. 79., Articles 3. through 5. is where Aquinas treats of the ACTIVE or AGENT intellect. Article 3, Reply Obj. 2. is where Aquinas presents two physical theories as to the effect of light. He eventually draws a parallel between physical light illuminating physical things, and the agent intellect "illumining" phantasms, so that the "possible intellect" can be informed, by the "agent intellect" with intelligible species (ideas) abstracted from such "phantasms/images". AQUINAS: "...But since Aristotle did not allow that the forms of natural things exist apart from matter (ie. Plato's doctrine of a separate world of the forms KB), and since forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible (ie. understandable KB) it follows that the natures or forms of the sensible things which we UNDERSTAND are not actually intelligible/(understandable KB). (PARADOX! KB) Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses are made actual by what is actually sensible. We must, therefore, assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by the abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for positing an AGENT intellect. [Summa I, Q. 79. Article 3. Exerpt from I ANSWER THAT...] BACK TO IVO'S CRITICISMS: 3.3. Our host teaches: “The Schoolmen employed the terms species impressa and expressa to signify these two aspects (impression and reaction) relating sensuous knowledge to the object known or to the subject knowing.” http://www.radicalacademy.com/philaquinasmdw3.htm and thus translates “expressio” not as “expression” but as “REACTION” YES! But De Wulf is relating "REACTION" to "species expressa", with RESPECT to the "reactive" aspect of SENSATION, in this section of his essay/s. IVO: But the dictionary in your mind probably also says otherwise, just as it says that “species sensibilis” should be translated as “sensible species”, not as “sensible image”. RETORT: No! Now that I understand what De Wulf was talking about and THAT he was talking about SENSATION and not IDEA FORMATION, "sensible species expressa" (active) makes sense, as does "sensible species impressa" (passive), because I know that "sensible species" are pushed like waves (of depolarization) right into various brain lobes. And to EX-PRESS literally means "to push out". With the ACTIVE aspect of sensation, the "pushing" (expression) is inward to the brain-stem and brain-lobes. But the brain also "pushes out" (expresses) reactions to such stimulations, so that, for example, we almost instantly, pull our hand away from a hot stove, without "thinking about it". As to my translation of "species sensibilis", as "sensible species", I continue to hold my ground. Sensible species are NOT "sensible IMAGES", and the author you cited, along with Aquinas, reconfirmed that learned-from-Aquinas (and my own experience) thesis, requote (your cited author): DE WULF: Thomas insists that this sense impression "is not known directly" (id quod cognoscitur). But an "oak image" is directly seen. It is THAT WHICH we perceive, by means of "sensible species", which are "that-by-which" we perceive OAK IMAGES. IVO: Right, I, who am totally lost, also translated “species expressa” as “expressed species". REPLY: As you should. There are a lot of latin derivatives in modern English, French, Italian, etc. etc. Our ancient predecessors in Europe spoke Latin as their scholarly and technical language. Q'elle surprise! (Probably misspelled). IVO: But why do you then give an even wronger/more wrong translation of “expressio” as “reflection”? REPLY: Because I was talking about images, and you were talking about ideas. Have you ever seen your image REFLECTED by a mirror, or by still water, or by the glass in the window of a building. Parallel to ideas, another question:- Have you never heard someone write a "piece" entitled "Reflections upon the war in 'wherever'", EXPRESSED in/by words? contd. KB Email: PaedoSocrates@aol.com
Kevin Sep 28th, 2007 - 4:52 PM	Re: species impressa et expressa IVO: Indeed, you are writing: KEVIN (requoted): Take your pick! Some images can be impressed on coins for example. Other images are EXPRESSED, OR, BETTER, REFLECTED from mirrors and/or still bodies of water. Others are arguably expressed by or from the pixels on your TV screen or upon Motion Picture Film Screens, which receive no impressions, but rather give them. IVO: Is the concept of “reaction” not wider than that of “reflection”? ANSWER: The "reaction" to which De Wulf referred was a sensitive REACTION to the stimulation, of an organ or organs of sense. So neither he, nor I were talking about CONCEPTS or IDEAS. We were talking about IMAGES and the "sensible species" which result in images of OAK TREES --- not concepts of oaks. You, by contrast, were clealy confusing Fr. Copleston's INTELLIGIBLE "species impressa" (impressed-species; actually abstracted-species) upon the POSSIBLE-intellect, with De Wulf's explanation of SENSIBLE "species impressa" upon a sense organ, and the REACTION (sensible species expressa) of that impressed organ to being stimulated by "sensible species". Fr. Copleston was clearly writing about the POSSIBLE and AGENT/active intellect abstracting IDEAS from "phantasms". I doubt he referred to the agent-intellect "REACTING" to an INTELLIGIBLE "species impressa" formed by its own ACTIVITY. The intellectual ACTIVITY of the agent and possible intellect, after concept formation (intelligible species formation; idea formation) is the ACTIVE (not "reactive") composition and division of INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES (ideas). Such ACTIVITY, arguably involving both the AGENT and POSSIBLE intellects (One power; two operations, to wit (1) Abstraction by which intelligible species are abstracted from images and (2) composition or division of intelligible species with or from each other) is what Aquinas calls the "verbum mentis" (mental word/s) which become EXPRESSED by speech --- primarily propositional speech. AQUINAS: Q. 85. Art. 2. Obj. 3. "Further, the philosopher says that WORDS ARE SIGNS OF PASSIONS (a.k.a. affections KB) IN THE SOUL. But words signify the THINGS understood, for we EXPRESS by word what we UNDERSTAND. Therefore these passions of the soul, viz. the INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES are WHAT is actually UNDERSTOOD. ON THE CONTRARY: The intelligible species is to the intellect what the SENSIBLE SPECIES (Anton Pegis translation; Professor Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies; TORONTO ONTARIO CANADA; Imprimitur James Cardinal McGuigan; Archbishop of Toronto, dated Jan 23, 1948; Copywrite Random House Inc. 1945, 1948; THE MODERN LIBRARY - New York) is to the sense. But the SENSIBLE SPECIES (Pegis!!!) is not WHAT is perceived, but rather, THAT BY WHICH the sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not WHAT is actually UNDERSTOOD but THAT BY WHICH the intellect understands. I ANSWER THAT, Some have asserted...this however is manifestly false for two reasons...Therefore it must be said that the INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES (idea/s) is related to the intellect as THAT BY WHICH it understands, which is proved thus...(etc.) REPLY OBJ. 3: There are 2 operations in the sensitive part. One is limited to IMMUTATION, and thus the operation of the senses take place when the senses are IMPRESSED by the sensible. The other is FORMATION, inasmuch as the imagination FORMS for itself an IMAGE of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these OPERATIONS are found in the INTELLECT (Intellectual immutation and formation? Probably since IMAGINATION is in other animals KB). AQUINAS (on 2 intellectual operations): For, (1) in the first place, there is the passion of the POSSIBLE-intellect, as INFORMED by the intelligible species (by abstraction of INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES from IMAGES in the composite with the AGENT intellect's power; 1 intellectual operation KB); and (2) then the POSSIBLE intellect, as thus INFORMED, then FORMS a DEFINITION, or a DIVISION, or a COMPOSITION, which is EXPRESSED by language. And so, the NOTION signified by a TERM is a DEFINITION; and a PROPOSITION signifies the intellect's DIVISION or COMPOSITION. Words do not, therefore, signify the INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES themselves (ie. They signify the things understood by means of intelligible species. KB); but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of JUDGING of EXTERNAL THINGS. IVO (requoted) Is the CONCEPT of “reaction” not wider than that of “reflection”? REPLY: IRRELEVANT! The concepts of ABSTRACTION, idea-FORMATION, idea-COMPOSITION and idea-DIVISION, all which occur UNCONSCIOUSLY in our minds/souls, until they are made PERCEIVABLE/sensible by means of spoken or written SYMBOLS, are the significant CONCEPTS which you fail to apprehend. Reaction and Reflection concern IMAGES more than IDEAS. This stuff is NOT "naive realism", nor simple-minded empiricism-AND/OR-rationalism. It's complex. KB Email: PaedoSocrates@aol.com
Kevin Sep 28th, 2007 - 6:46 PM	Re: species impressa et expressa Sep 28th, 2007 - 5:44 AM Re: species impressa et expressa IVO: You, who don't know Latin, continue to maintain that the translation by the Dominican Fathers, which is now more than half a century old,is wrong. What do you want me to tell you? REPLY: Tell me that you looked up a translation of that Latin or English 2-term expression in some language that you understand. Try French. Try German. Try Latin, since you had 6 years of it. Try Tagalo if you actually understand that language. I said that I don't SPEAK Latin, Ivo. But I can certainly UNDERSTAND simple Latin terms used by Aquinas and simple Greek terms used by Aristotle, because Scientific language is loaded with literal English transliterations of such technical terms, which SCIENTISTS were "too lazy" to translate. So they TRANSLITERATED such terms. Most significantly, I am using the TRANSLATION of Anton Pegis, as I previously stated. And he was a PONTIFICAL ACADEMY "medieval scholar", which means he KNEW "medieval Latin", probably far better than the English Dominicans of the 1920's. "Popish priests" were still inordinately unpopular in Victorian England. Catholic universities were probably non-existent at the time. The English Catholic priesthood was almost still "underground" until John Henry Cardianl Newman's "betrayal" of the English Church or "conversion" to Roman Catholocism made being Roman Catholic quasi-respectable. Then there was "the great war" of 1914 - 1918, which arguably made English Dominican consultation or collaboration with French Dominicans difficult and with German Dominicans "treasonous". And they didn't do a translation of the SUMMA that quickly. The Leonine Edition of St. Thomas's Works has been ongoing since Leo The Great's Pontificate!!! So the English Dominican translation of The Summa was miraculously "quick" compared with an unfinished papal edition of Aquinas's complete works. Maybe their Swahili or Chineze translators are "bogging" down the "process". I have no idea WHAT they could be doing to "take forever". Maybe SATAN is their Chief Translator for all I know. "It" would arguably want Aquinas "slowed down" but "full speed ahead" for Robert Nozick vs. John Rawls and a cast of "thousands-of-sophists-with-tenure", including the "50-xth" Edition of Lord Russell's 1912 edition of THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY, which should have been titled "THE actual PROBLEMS with BRITISH EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY" (one FALSE Contrary) vs. "MORE actual PROBLEMS with CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY" (the other FALSE Contrary). And you should be able to consider, that the England of the pre-1920's still ruled an empire. Their scientists and mathematicians were "top drawer". Their astronomers were "the best". Nobody had "dethroned" Newton. They were VICTORIANS (even the Catholics) and proud/happy to be English, while BRITISH EMPIRICISM was proving far more science- enlightening than Cartesian-Kantian anything. So the English Dominicans had to be influenced by British Empiricism, even and especially as critics. They'd be required to take philosophy courses, featuring British Empiricists. And the British Empiricists uniformly CONFUSE or CONFLATE "images" with "ideas". So it would be, all told, a very easy thing for an English Dominican to, very innocently, confuse or conflate an "image" and an "idea". Your De Wulf author noted the phenomenon. And my translator, Anton Pegis, caught them in another small mistranslation where somebody ignored "tantum", meaning "ONLY" (eg Sed tantum dic verbo... = But ONLY say the word...). That (missed-term) mistranslation tended to cause an egregious MISINTERPRETATION of another answer to a question of the Summa because the word ahead of "tantum/only" was the term "NOT". There is a huge difference between "NOT-X" and "NOT-ONLY-X". I forget where that mistranslation, caused by a missing term, occurs, but it caused a big "ruckus" between James Miguez and myself on his so-called "Thomism" site. However he talks about "Cartesian-Thomists", while trying to avoid obvious equivalents like "Square-Circles". He, like you Ivo, tried to hide behind "Latin Expertise" and claimed "Latin Incompetence" on my part. But I have a Latin translator and medical laboratory experience. Aristotle and disciples almost invented modern medical discipline (and much of the language) except for the "hypotheses", which would have caused Aristotle to "wince". But Aristotle loved FORMULAE and OBSERVATION, which is exactly WHAT applied laboratory science ENTAILS. The research guys fool around with hypotheses. But applied-science-techs employ PROVEN formulae and "Aristotelian" OBSERVATIONAL techniques. Any UTTER-ILLITERATE who has eyes can OBSERVE the structural difference between the SHAPES Aquinas uses to symbolize IMAGE and the different SHAPES he uses to sybolizing SPECIES! Q.E.D. Kevin Email: PaedoSocrates@aol.com
Ivo Cerckel Sep 29th, 2007 - 4:50 PM	Re: species impressa et expressa You mean Latin illiterate who translates species as species? Email: ivocerckel@siquijor.ws
Kevin Oct 4th, 2007 - 3:52 AM	Re: Re: species impressa et expressa KEVIN: Any UTTER-ILLITERATE who has eyes can OBSERVE the structural difference between the SHAPES Aquinas uses to symbolize IMAGE and the different SHAPES he uses to sybolizing SPECIES! Q.E.D. Kevin IVO: You mean Latin illiterate who translates species as species? REPLY: No! I mean the English Dominican functional illiterate/s who/which CONFLATED the Latin term "species" with the English term "IMAGE"! That functional illiterate or functional illiterates thereby TRANSLATED the Latin expression "species sensibilus" of Aquinas, into the English expression "sensible IMAGE", thereby confusing an IMAGE (English) with a SPECIES (English). And nobody "TRANSLATES" (your exprssion) terms which have been TRANSLITERATED from one language (Latin) to another language (English)! In short "species" is a Latin term and an English term. It is the same term in both English and Latin because the term was "transliterated". To be "transliterated" means to take a term from one language and introduce it into another language without changing either its spelling or its MEANING, otherwise known as its DEFINITION. Hence, to (as you do, Ivo) speak of a TRANSLITERATED expression (transliterated from Latin to English; same spelling and same meaning) such as SPECIES (Latin term), as a TRANSLATED term (English term "SPECIES"; same term and same meaning in both languages) is to DEMONSTRATE your ignorance of the difference between TRANSLATION and TRANSLITERATION. In short, nobody has to "translate" individual terms from one language into another language when they are the same terms with the same definitions in two distinct languages. I also told you that SCIENTISTS are "notorious" for TRANSLITERATING terms from one language into another language. That is because, at one time, people who were trained as scholars, were required to study either Latin or Greek (preferably BOTH) in order to obtain ANY University degree, in either "the arts" or "the sciences". Similarly, prior to "modern universities", anyone who wanted to "talk shop" in THEOLOGY, for example, in the "medieval universities", was required to know BOTH Latin and Greek terms, in order to understand anything about Theology, because the languages of "original theology", for medieval Christians, like Aquinas, were Hebrew or Greek, even when Latin was one's original language or "mother tongue". It is not a strict "accident" that Pontius Pilate had his inscription written in Hebrew, Greek and Latin on Christ's cross. The Romans took over the Hellenistic Empire from the Greeks. And there were 10 strictly Greek cities in "Philistia" [the land of the Philistines; a name which was a Roman snub of the Hebrew names Juda (Jacob's lion-like son) and Israel (Jacob's name after he wrestled with an angel)] or Palestine (as it is known today; derived from "Philistia")] called the DECAPOLIS [literally 10 Cities; a tranliteration of the Roman word for 10, "deca" equivalent to the Greek "deka" and the Greek term for city "polis"; Thus DECAPOLIS --- perfectly understood by Latin speakers, who also knew Greek. Hence, no need to TRANSLATE "transliterations"]. As a consequence of such close INTERACTION between Roman and Greek citizens of "THE ROMAN EMPIRE" Greek terms were tranliterated into Latin terms. And since St. Paul was literate in all 3 languages where philosophical and scientific terms were used (Hebrew, Greek and Latin), the language of "theology" (a Greek expression) consisted of a lot of transliterated terms. All of Christian theology employed Greek terms, at first, because it was only Greek Christians who argued theology and dogma (Greek term) at the early Ecumenical Councils. The first major Christian theologian who WROTE ONLY IN LATIN was Augustine because he didn't like the beatings he received from his "tutor" in the Greek tongue. But he still UNDERSTOOD the Greek language. He simply refused to write "Greek". My son, who teaches English literature, still presides over TUTORials, with his students --- another Latin to English transliteration from the Latin "tutor" (watcher-of-students/pupils). One really cannot read an English Dictionary, such as my Oxford Concise, without noticing that a modern English vocabulary consists, in large part, of Greek, Latin, French and Germanic transliterations! IN SUM, nobody "translates" transliterations. However, one may be able to DEFINE the Latin term SPECIES and the transliterated English term SPECIES in either language. And the DEFINITIONS should be identical, although the terms used, in either language, will, of course, be different terms, since NO LANGUAGE is entirely transliterated. Were that the case, then every human would speak and have the same language. IN CONCLUSION:- "Species" does not strictly mean "IMAGE" in either Latin or English. So, once again, we have a bad and confusing mistranslation of Aquinas's "species-sensibilus" by English Dominicans in both languages. Kevin Email: PaedoSocrates@aol.com

	The Radical Academy Discussion Forum Philosophy, Politics, and the Human Condition
Search For Similar Forums · Return to Website