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Philosophy, Politics, and the Human Condition
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Kevin
Sep 26, 07 - 1:01 AM |
IDEAS (intelligible Species) ABSTRACTED from PHANTASMS
Summa I, Q. 85., Article 2. IVO (writes) Re: thingification of ideas - Thomas’ Commentaries on Aristotle Summa of the Summa I, 85 SECOND ARTICLE WHETHER THE INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES ABSTRACTED FROM THE PHANTASM IS RELATED TO OUR INTELLECT AS THAT WHICH IS UNDERSTOOD OBJECTION 2 Further, what is actually understood must be in something; else it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the soul: for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid intelligible species. ... QUESTION: What happened to objection 1, Ivo?????!!! Why not start with the first objection? Still reading selectively, as usual. And who translated this article? Aquinas clearly writes, in Latin, for the "Sed Contra" or the ON THE CONTRARY part of the article, quote AQUINAS: Sed contra, species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum, sicut species sensibilis ad sensum. Sed species sensibilis non est illud quod sentitur, sed magis id quo sensus sentit. Ergo species intelligibilis non est quod intelligitur actu, sed id quo intelligit intellectus. EXPLANATION: One does not have to be a Latin expert to understand that "SPECIES INTELLIGIBILIS", was translated into English as "Intelligible Species". So why did the translator of this Article NOT translate "SPECIES SENSIBILIS" as "sensible species"? My translation of this article, Edited by Anton Pegis reads SENSIBLE SPECIES and NOT "sensible image", for a sensible image is either a "phantasm" (recalled image) or an actually sensed VISIBLE OBJECT (an image if actually seen by means of the eyes and brain working in concert). With the translation "sensible image" we get a ridiculous consequence when Aquinas continues with, in English mistranslation, quote:- AQUINAS: But the sensible image (correct translation = "sensible species") is NOT WHAT is PERCEIVED, but rather THAT BY WHICH sense perceives. COMMENTS: That translation, featuring "sensible image" (not "species sensibilis" or "sensible species) is RIDICULOUS because a SENSIBLE IMAGE is exactly and actually WHAT IS PERCEIVED, by means of the sense of sight. The "sensible species", by contrast, are light wavelengths and intensities, audible percussions, various SPECIFIC molecules, or SPECIFIC temperature or mechanical AFFECTS upon various nerve receptors of various body organs, which are SPECIFICALLY adapted to, or, in other words, suited to, receive SPECIFIC kinds of stimulators/stimulations. Take, for example, with RESPECT to the sense of sight, the rods and cones in the retinas of our eyes. These SPECIALIZED receptors are SPECIFICALLY stimulated by either "lumens" of light intensity (modern physicists would say "photons" of light energy), or SPECIFIC wave-lengths of light, with frequency-distances of between 4000 angstroms (blue-violet wavelength) and 7000 angstroms (red=infrared wavelength). But we don't see "light-waves" of approximately 6300 angstroms. Instead we see the color "RED". We don't see "lumens" or "photons" of light energy, but, rather, the CONTRAST between "patches" or "shades" of lightness and darkness. They ("lumens/photons" or "SPECIFIC wavelengths of light") are the SENSIBLE SPECIES BY WHICH we see colors and shades of light and darkness. Photons and light wavelengths (sensible species) are NOT THAT WHICH we see, but, rather THAT BY WHICH we see the colors, shades and shapes of things. The colors shades and shapes of things are THAT WHICH (images) we see. The ANALOGY between the various PIXELS on a Television screen, and the CONES and RODS of the retinas of our EYES is almost perfect. But the PIXELS on a TV screen are SPECIFIC light-emittors, whereas the CONES and RODS of our eyes are SPECIFIC light-receptors. There is probably a better analogy between the cones and rods of our eyes and the specific receptors in a color-TV camera, or the kinds of molecules in the color film EMULSION layered on verious brands of color film. When you go to the other SPECIFIC "sense-receptors", such as taste, for example, we don't "taste" molecules of acetic acid (ie. vinegar), stimulating SPECIFIC kinds of "taste buds", designed to react to acidic compounds. We taste "SOUR" or "sourness" instead. The sour taste of too much vinegar in our salad dressing is THAT WHICH we taste. The stimulation of certain kinds of taste buds by acetic acid or vinegar is THAT BY WHICH or THE MEANS BY WHICH we "sense" a sour taste. (contd) |
Ivo
Sep 26th, 2007 - 3:40 AM |
QUESTION OF KEVIN: What happened to objection 1, Ivo?????!!! Why not start with the first objection? Still reading selectively, as usual. REPLY OF IVO: Objection 1 is not included in Kreeft’s Summa of Summa. But you speak Latin now? That makes it easier. Then I have only to copy and past. But that will be for tomorrow my time. I am no Latin expert, but I had six years of Latin in high school. Granted, that’s more than 25 years ago, but I will try. Perhaps I will find the English in the Shorter Summa. I was indeed confused when comparing art 85 in the Summa of the Summa with the Shorter Summa. The back cover of the Summa of the Summa says that Kreeft has selected those passages from Thomas that are intrinsically important, non-technical enough to be intelligible to modern readers, and most likely to be used in class or by independent readers who want to study the Summa on their own. Page 19 says that the translation used is the old, “literal” Dominican translation, originally published in America by Benziger Brothers. I confirm that this translation says in the second sentence after “On the contrary”: But the SENSIBLE IMAGE is not what is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. (p. 325 of Kreeft) There is moreover a footnote 85 by Kreeft on that p. 325 which (the footnote) starts as follows: The analogy between sense images and ideas (“intelligible species”) is not perfect I am afraid therefore that “species sensibilis” should NOT be translated as “sensible species". But I am no Latin expert. |
Kevin
Sep 27th, 2007 - 3:38 AM |
QUESTION OF (actually asked BY) KEVIN: What happened to objection 1, Ivo?????!!! Why not start with the first objection? Still reading selectively, as usual. REPLY OF IVO: Objection 1 is not included in Kreeft’s Summa of Summa. REPLY: Well go onto the New Advent website and get St. Thomas in one English translation of the Summa. Better still, find a translation of St. Thomas's SUMMA in your own FIRST LANGUAGE, which is either Flemish or Walloon, although FRENCH or GERMAN is probably your most accurately understood second "tongue". Compare a French translation of that article with a German and an English translation AND THEN YOU'LL HAVE A BETTER GRASP OF THE BIASES OF TRANSLATORS for their own "ideas", since IDEAS are translatable/expressable in any language. IVO: But you speak Latin now? That makes it easier. Then I have only to copy and past(e). But that will be for tomorrow my time. REPLY: No! I do not speak Latin. I regurgitated it as a young altar boy, but did not accurately know what was meant by the Latin. I could UNDERSTAND the same prayers, in English, but knew nothing of the specifics of Latin Grammar or useage. My primary EXPERIENCE is in Clinical Laboratory Medicine Biochemistry, or Clinical Biochemistry, for short. As a consequence of doing Laboratory Medicine, which has 5 distinct disciplines (Clinical Biochemistry, Clinical Hematology, Medical Microbiology, Immunohematology (blood banking) and clinical histology), I know quite a bit about CAUSE - EFFECT relations which can and do GO WRONG in large and small ORGAN SYSTEMS --- but for the most part they do NOT go wrong, which is quite amazing when you KNOW how many things that may and sometimes do "go wrong" in such systems. I also know a fair amount of PHYSIOLOGY and clinical PATHOLOGY. Hence I KNOW that nobody "senses" waves of localized depolarization along their nerve fibers, which eventually arrive in very SPECIFIC and specialized brain Lobes. So I know that nobody feels or "senses" SENSIBLE SPECIES. They are THAT BY WHICH we sense external objects --- not THAT WHICH we sense or know about external objects. I have seen grown men cry, when told that their damaged eye has to be removed, for if it is not removed, their healthy eye will GO BLIND in "sympathy" with their, now useless, damaged eye. (Incidentally, that was a LIE OF MEDICAL CONVENIENCE to the patient involved --- for if the good eye is completely covered up and "senses" NO LIGHT for about 6 months, it will start all over with NO SYMPATHY for the damaged and now useless eye. But the person would be completely blind for 6 months and unable to return to work or whatever. So his doctor lied to him, to get him out of the hospital and back to work or whatever more quickly. You've had the same experiences with medical people who only treat individual PARTS and NOT THE WHOLE PERSON. In sum, there are LYING EXPERTS, or simple INCOMPETENTS in every profession, including medicine, but especially including "modern philosophy". Personally, I don't believe anyone, until I cross-check several experts against my own knowledge and understanding --- limited as it may be. IVO: I am no Latin expert, but I had six years of Latin in high school. Granted, that’s more than 25 years ago, but I will try. REPLY: Don't worry about the LANGUAGE. Pick the language you UNDERSTAND BEST and then cross-check the translation in THAT LANGUAGE and as many languages as you UNDERSTAND, which are certainly more than LATIN alone. I've seen you translate from both FRENCH and GERMAN. Use the skills you have, and quit relying upon dimwit translators with NO EXPERIENCE of anything other than being mistaught Aristotle or Aquinas, or anybody else, except in their own "tongues". IVO: Perhaps I will find the English in the Shorter Summa. I was indeed confused when comparing art (question) 85 in the Summa of the Summa with the Shorter Summa. REPLY: Find Q.85, Art. 2 on New Advent, if you want ENGLISH. New Advent contains that obvious MISTRANSLATION. It is an OBVIOUS MISTRANSLATION because "phantasm" means "recalled-IMAGE" --- which is OBVIOUS from the very question itself which mentions PHANTASMS (recalled images, recalled smells, recalled sounds, recalled tastes and/or recalled touches)). And I previously said that I had a different ENGLISH TRANSLATION from Anton Pegis, who UNDERSTOOD both ancient Greek and medieval Latin, being a professor at the PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIEVAL STUDIES at a Canadian University (buddy of Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson and other French Thomists). IVO: The back cover of the Summa of the Summa says that Kreeft has selected those passages from Thomas that are intrinsically important, non-technical enough to be intelligible to modern readers, and most likely to be used in class or by independent readers who want to study the Summa on their own. (contd.) |
Kevin
Sep 27th, 2007 - 3:50 AM |
IVO: Page 19 says that the translation used is the old, LITERAL Dominican translation, originally published in America by Benziger Brothers. REPLY: "Bully" for a "paid advertisement" by some editor on a back-cover, who probably has never read either Aquinas or Kreeft!!! IVO: I confirm that this translation says in the second sentence after “On the contrary”: But the SENSIBLE IMAGE is NOT what is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. (p. 325 of Kreeft) REBUTTAL: And who would actually beleive that a SENSIBLE IMAGE is NOT WHAT IS SENSED (not perceived)?!!! One must be either a functioinal illiterate in both English and in LATIN, or an OBFUSCATOR in either language to translate "species sensibilis" as "sensible image", in a question and article where PHANTASM means RECALLED-SENSE-IMAGE by means of the imagination. IVO: There is moreover a footnote 85 by Kreeft on that p. 325 which (the footnote) starts as follows: The analogy between sense images and ideas (“intelligible species”) is not perfect. REPLY Of course the analogy is "NOT PERFECT" because the translation is DEAD WRONG!!! Recalled IMAGES ("phantasmata") are always of recalled sensory PARTICULARS, while any SPECIE, whether sensible or intelligible, is a "UNIVERSAL" (common to more than one thing). No "particular" is a universal and No UNIVERSAL is directly "perceivable". Anyone who knows Aristotle's GENUS-SPECIES doctrine, knows that both SPECIES and GENERA are universals, while all IMAGES, whether sensed in the present or remembered as "phantasmata", are of individual things. The translation is DEAD WRONG, along with the so-called "analogy". But Aquinas's ANALOGY between sensible SPECIES (universals) and intelligible SPECIES (universals) is DEAD RIGHT and a perfect ANALOGY, because Aquinas was just that "kinda guy" --- both LITERATE and extraordinarily more INTELLIGENT than most of his dopey translators and dopier interpreters. Same thing with Aristotle. IVO: I am afraid therefore that “species sensibilis” should NOT be translated as “sensible species". But I am no Latin expert. REPLY: Be "afraid" all you want, Ivo. But "species sensibilis" can only be correctly translated into English as "sensible species", and NOT CORRECTLY TRANSLATED as "sensible IMAGE". The PNC, and BOTH Latin and English GRAMMAR "say so", along with Aquinas, quote AQUINAS: Q. 85, Article 1. WHETHER OUR INTELLECT UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL AND MATERIAL THINGS BY ABSTRACTION FROM PHANTASMS? ---------------- 5 Articles whose arguments all suggest NO answers to the question. --------------- ON THE CONTRARY (writes Aquinas in Latin as "Sed Contra") The philosopher says that "THINGS ARE INTELLIGIBLE IN PROPORTION AS THEY ARE SEPARABLE FROM MATTER" (De Anima Bk III, Ch. 7. 431a line 14). Therefore material things must needs be understood as they are ABSTRACTED from MATTER and from MATERIAL IMAGES, namely, PHANTASMS. COMMENTARY: Notice that even in English translation, a PHANTASM, is "namely" a MATERIAL IMAGE, and vice versa. So, in English translation MATERIAL IMAGES are, namely, PHANTASMS and NOT "sensible species". In Latin "material images" are literally written as "similitudinibus materialibus", or, in English "material similitudes" in direct literal English translation; Not "species sensibilus" in Latin nor "sensible species" in English. Similitude, in English means a "likeness", as when we say things like, "That portrait is a good likeness." (of the person painted in a portrait). So if Aquinas wanted to write about "sensible IMAGES", he would have written something to the effect of "similitudinus materialibus SENSIBILIS" or "phantasmata sensibilus" and NOT "species sensibilus", which is a perfect ANALOG of "species intelligibus". If you want to check the Latin expression of the English translation above cited from Q. 85, Article 1., which is only one question and a few articles away from Q. 85, Article 2., I can give you both, to compare side by side (actually top and bottom). Then compare them to translations in a language that you actually UNDERSTAND. ONCE AGAIN... AQUINAS (in English): ON THE CONTRARY, The philosopher says that "THINGS ARE INTELLIGIBLE IN PROPORTION AS THEY ARE SEPARABLE FROM MATTER" (De Anima). Therefore material things must needs be understood as they are ABSTRACTED from MATTER and from MATERIAL IMAGES, namely, PHANTASMS. AQUINAS (in Latin): Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod "SICUT RES SUNT SEPARABILES A MATERIA, SIC CIRCA INTELLECTUM SUNT." Ergo oportet quod materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a similitudinibus materialibus (material images), quae sunt phantasmata. More to come, KB |
Kevin
Sep 27th, 2007 - 4:05 AM |
Requoting Aquinas in both English and Latin on recalled IMAGES or PHANTASMS and MATERIAL SIMILITUDES (sensed images), in contrast to "sensible species", quote:- Q. 85 Article 1 AQUINAS (in English): ON THE CONTRARY, The philosopher says that "THINGS ARE INTELLIGIBLE IN PROPORTION AS THEY ARE SEPARABLE FROM MATTER" (De Anima). Therefore material things must needs be understood as they are ABSTRACTED from MATTER and from MATERIAL IMAGES, namely, PHANTASMS. AQUINAS (in Latin): Sed contra est quod dicitur in III de anima, quod "SICUT RES SUNT SEPARABILES A MATERIA, SIC CIRCA INTELLECTUM SUNT." Ergo oportet quod materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a similitudinibus materialibus (material images), quae sunt phantasmata. You might ask yourself from these "above and below" quotations, WHERE is Aquinas's Latin reference to "The philosopher" in the actual Latin, because there is no Latin reference to "the philosopher" in the Latin, "Sed Contra" above quoted? It is not there, in Latin, because Aquinas is directly responding to the 5th objection with his SED CONTRA. And the 5th objection reads, in Latin... AQUINAS: Obj. 5. Praeterea, PHILOSOPHUS, in III de anima, dicit quod "INTELLECTUS INTELLIGIT SPECIES IN PHANTASMATIBUS." Non ergo eas abstrahendo. There is your reference to the philosopher, as "philosophus", in the objection immediately preceding Aquinas's ON THE CONTRARY. The English translator literally keeps the reference to "the philosopher" in his "ON THE CONTRARY translation, which is, in Latin, merely implied by its close connection and proximity to Objection 5. But none of this writing about IMAGES, in either the direct Latin or in English translation, refers to "sensible IMAGES" as either "sensible species" or "species sensibilus". ON THE CONTRARY, when writing of the English expression IMAGE, in Latin, Aquinas uses 1 Latin term and 1 Latin expression equivalently. He employs "phantasmata" (term) and/or "similitudinibus materialibus" (expression) as equivalent to "MATERIAL IMAGES" in English translation. A literal Latin-English expression of the translated expression "material image" would be "MATERIAL SIMILITUDE". Interpreted, that expression would probably read in English "material likeness", as in a portrait is a painted likeness or an IMAGE of a person. Sensible Species (in our sense organs and brains) are no more COMPLETE IMAGES than are simple brush strokes (by a painter) complete PORTRAITS! A sensible SPECIFIC, such as the color ORANGE, is no more an IMAGE of a pumpkin, than is the color blue an IMAGE of an ocean or a clear blue sky! Sensible SPECIES are "parts" which make up a "whole-IMAGE". And IMAGES not only include color-specifics, but also the shape and shade SPECIFICS of visibly perceptible objects. So much for the English translation of "MATERIAL IMAGES" from Aquinas's (1) Latin term "phantasmata" or (2) Latin expression "similitudinibus materialibus" of which neither are (3) "species sensibilis". The sensible species are THAT BY WHICH, not THAT WHICH we sense. We actually sense IMAGES, smells, sounds etc. by means of such sensible species. Aquinas writes about the senses never being wrong about their proper objects (sensible species), as does Aristotle. But he also writes, in Q.16, Article 2., quote AQUINAS (Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?): I ANSWER THAT...(snip)...Since everything is true, according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true according as it has the likeness of the thing known, which is its form as a knowing power. For this reason TRUTH is defined by THE CONFORMITY OF INTELLECT AND THING; and hence to know truth. But in NO WAY does sense know this. For although SIGHT has the likeness (image?) of a visible thing, yet it DOES NOT KNOW the comparison which exists between the THING SEEN and THAT WHICH it itself is APPREHENDING concerning it. COMMENT: The "that which" the sense of SIGHT is actually apprehending are "sensible species". But, as Aquinas writes, the sense of sight DOES NOT KNOW the comparison between the THING SEEN (an image) and THAT WHICH it itself is APPREHENDING concerning it. So "sensible species" are the means by which, the sense of sight gets its likeness (image) of an external thing or object. Sensible species are THAT BY WHICH the sense of sight puts together THAT WHICH (an image) it actually sees. Similarly with "intelligible species" (ideas). They are not THAT WHICH we perceive or even understand, but rather THAT BY WHICH (the means by which) we understand intelligible objects outside our bodies and souls/minds. completed next post KB |
Kevin
Sep 27th, 2007 - 4:57 AM |
RECAPPING LAST POST: Sensible species are THAT BY WHICH the sense of sight puts together THAT WHICH (an image) it actually sees. Similarly with "intelligible species" (ideas). They are not THAT WHICH we perceive or even understand, but rather THAT BY WHICH (the means by which) we understand intelligible objects outside our bodies and souls/minds. TOO CONTINUE: Ideas or "intelligible species" may even be THAT BY WHICH we may understand our own minds --- if and only if, we give up falsely believing that we can see or perceive the IDEAS (intelligible species) in our own souls/minds. Modern philosophy starts with that identical error by both Descartes and Locke. They thought they could DIRECTLY PERCEIVE their own ideas. And neither of them are the least bit "shy" about clearly stating that error. Locke starts with it. Descartes takes awhile to clearly expresss that little error. But after those 2 guys clearly stated that error, the "isms" in "philosophy" (sophistry) started multiplying like rabbits --- all designed to escape various repugnant conclusions which logically follow from that little error in the beginning. Thus my original questions: Q. Do you see your eyes? A. No! You do not see your own eyes. You see a visible object which is NOT your eyes. Your eyes are THAT BY WHICH (the means by which) you see THAT WHICH (a visible object) which is not your eyes. You see that visible object by means of your eyes. You don't see your eyes. Of course you KNOW that you have eyes in your head by the effect they have. You can actually see things which are not your eyes. So you know you have eyes INDIRECTLY, because of their effects. Q. Do you see your ideas? A. No! You do not see your own ideas. You mentally see (understand) an INTELLIGIBLE OBJECT, which is NOT an idea. That intelligible object may be, in many cases, also a visible object. However the vast majority of terms in any dictionary in any language actually refer to MENTAL OPERATIONS, expressed (made visible or audible) by means of VERBAL SYMBOLS, otherwise known as WORDS or terms. As to the "ideas" or "intelligible species" themselves, they are, once again, THAT BY WHICH we understand intelligible objects. They are NOT "that which" we directly perceive or understand. They are the MEANS BY WHICH we understand or "mentally see" (understand) intelligible objects, which in many case are NOT IDEAS, but actual physical objects. But the mind doesn't stop there. It begins, at or around the age of reason, to FORM IDEAS, by which we may UNDERSTAND "intelligible objects", which have no physical/material "being" at all. Things like truth, goodness, beauty (ideas by which we Judge) and liberty justice and equality (ideas by which we live well, rather than as the "slaves" of others). Such "ideas" about non-physical objects are really hard to "grasp" or to understand, without good teachers, such as Socrates, Aristotle or Aquinas. Plato tried real hard. But he didn't have the tenacity of Socrates, nor the LOGICAL TOOLS and more numerous and different observations of Aristotle. Plato was a great teacher. But both his teacher (Socrates) and his best student (Aristotle) were, both of them, more tenacious (in both Socrates's and Aristotle's cases) and better informed (Aristotle). Socrates was not as "well informed" as either Plato or Aristotle. But his great strength was that he never made wild guesses about things he did not know, and when he knew anything he also knew both its source (his teachers) and its CAUSE/s. As A.N. Whitehead mistakenly asserts:- Everything in philosophy is just "footnotes" upon Plato. But he is close --- footnotes to Plato and Aristotle. KEVIN |
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